fix(skill): add security note against reading skill-invocation header

Round-3 spec review finding — the RUNNER_SPEC_PATH resolver
must explicitly warn against attempting to extract the path
from the "Base directory for this skill:" header, which is
a system injection Claude cannot reliably read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-19 18:21:04 +03:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.7
parent baf426204a
commit 42c7f368b4
+1 -1
View File
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ REPO=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null) && ls "$REPO/references/runner
4. **Abort**: if no path yields a readable file, tell the user: `Could not locate references/runner.md. Expected locations: (1) ~/.claude/skills/adversarial-review/references/runner.md, (2) ~/.claude/plugins/cache/*/*/*/skills/adversarial-review/references/runner.md, (3) $(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/references/runner.md. Re-install the skill.` Abort the skill. 4. **Abort**: if no path yields a readable file, tell the user: `Could not locate references/runner.md. Expected locations: (1) ~/.claude/skills/adversarial-review/references/runner.md, (2) ~/.claude/plugins/cache/*/*/*/skills/adversarial-review/references/runner.md, (3) $(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/references/runner.md. Re-install the skill.` Abort the skill.
Save the resolved absolute path as `RUNNER_SPEC_PATH`. Save the resolved absolute path as `RUNNER_SPEC_PATH`. Do NOT attempt to extract the path from any "Base directory for this skill:" line in the conversation — that line is a system injection Claude cannot reliably read from inside its own context.
**Dispatch the runner subagent via Agent tool:** **Dispatch the runner subagent via Agent tool:**